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Progress, Scientific and Human

Gualberto Gismondi

I. Meanings and Uses of the Term – II. Progress as a General, Historical and Philosophical Term. 1. The Problem in Ancient Times. 2. The Modern Age: Progress and history. 3. The Modern Age: Progress and science. 4. The Contemporary Epoch: Irreversible Decline of the Idea of Progress. – III. The Epistemological Debate of the 20th Century. 1. Scientific Progress as an Epistemological problem. 2. 1960-1970: The Comparison between Fundamentalism and Skepticism. 3. 1980-1990: The Semantic Views beyond Fundamentalism and Skepticism. – IV. Three Centuries of Debate about Progress: Reflections and Observations – V. The Concept of “Progress” According to the Documents of the Roman Catholic Church. – VI. Scientific Progress and the Relationship between Science and Faith.

I. Meanings and Uses of the Term

First of all, I would like to mention only certain meanings and uses of the term. The concept of progress will be defined into more details all along the article. The word “progress” has been frequently used in cultural discussions and it is still used in common language. Its “general” meaning as pertains to human history has been debated throughout modern times. Its “specific” meaning in science has been studied in depth, more critically, through epistemology and the history of science from the middle of the 19th century to the 20th century. Since the understanding of its general meaning facilitates the understanding of its more specific one, let us focus on the first one and then we will go on focusing on specific meaning in science. Etymologically, “progress” (lat. pro-gredi) indicates a way forward, a movement in a given direction and especially an “advancement”, a gradual development and passage to something more or better. In this sense, it can be applied to everything: conscience, ideas, methods, objects, devices, works, social relations, traditions, lifestyles, etc. Within the concept of progress, the ideas of “improvement” and “perfection” can be understood in a general or specific sense. Their opposite is “regression” or going backward, decadence, a return to primitive or less advanced stages. The notion of  “evolution”, that generally is referred to as natural and biological facts, can be considered a synonym of all the previous meanings.

Above all, progress deals with that which is specifically “human”: intelligence, will, capacity and any other work that results from it. In a general sense, it referred to universal human history, understood as continual advancement in one direction; the homogeneous accumulation of knowledge; the unlimited improvement of the moral and material conditions. Specifically, it referred particularly to modern experimental sciences and their consequences: the homogenous and cumulative development of different knowledges; intellectual and moral growth through scientific “truths”; human happiness as a material good, etc. This vision of progress reached its peak from the 19th to the middle of the 20th century, becoming the “second conscience of the European man” (cf. Sasso, 1980, p. 636) and the “faith” of intellectuals and the ruling classes. It was inculcated in the masses as such and applied to every field:  culture,  history, civilization, institutions, sciences, technique, mass-media, etc. It finally invaded the political, social, theological and ecclesiastical worlds (where terms such as “progressives”, “conservatives”, “reactionaries” began to be used). This expansion caused the decline, which then spurred from the indiscriminate, polemic and ideological uses of the concept which rendered it ever more vague, ambiguous and insignificant.

II. Progress as a General, Historical and Philosophical Term

1. The problem in Ancient Times. The philosophical and historical analysis of the concept highlights complex problems and contrasting positions. It is not easy to place these positions in a historical or logical order. In antiquity, the idea was not completely unfamiliar, but it remained unexpressed because of the predominance of mythical language. In the 5th century B.C., because of success in mathematics and medicine, the Greeks began to connect science and progress. Wars (for example the Pelopenesian War) on the other hand gave rise to pessimism. In any case, upon reflecting on world and human events, ideas of decadence of the world and humanity, of the perennial cycle of events (the myth of the “eternal return”), of the inexorability of fatum and of blind chance would prevail. For stoics and neo-platonics, the term indicates personal, moral and ascetic improvement. Biblical and Christian revelation introduced some ideas that became fundamental to the concept of progress: a unitarian vision of humanity; salvation as universal history; history guided by Providence toward a positive end; a linear conception of time; the succession of historical events; the urgency of moral and spiritual improvement, etc. ( TIME, IV). Hope and Christian optimism about the ultimate future of humanity are still considered the primary semantic nucleus of the idea of progress.

Their realization in more concrete and specific contents, never the less, were yet to be confirmed by cultural factors and historical conditions which were extremely different from ancient times. Therefore, in the first centuries of the Christian era, various attitudes and conflicting evaluations regarding progress or decline changed. In De civitate Dei, in considering the role of human beings in the world, in time and history,  St. Augustine (354-430) emphasized the polyvalence and ambiguity of human discoveries about the final destiny, distinguishing those that are necessary and useful from those that are detrimental and dangerous. Therefore, he brought investigative intelligence and human industry out. His ideas which are so important in Western culture are considered useful also for scientific thought. They influenced all of the Middle Ages during which the idea of progress was taken up again as a personal duty focused on improving not only the conscience but especially moral, religious and spiritual behavior. According to  St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), «it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect» (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 97, a. 1).

2 The Modern Age: Progress and History. The context changed radically in modern times, as the “historical progress” of man and humanity was debated philosophically, combining and juxtaposing negative and positive interpretations. In the humanistic age and during the Renaissance, European thought concentrated on aspects of earthly life. In the 17th century, experimental-scientific thought emerged and it was considered as a kind of ideal and perfect knowledge. Its most enthusiastic supporters were precursors to the ideology of progress. F. Bacon (1561-1626) saw experimental knowledge as cumulative and capable of useful employment. Descartes (1596-1650), originally wanted for his work On Method (1637) a more significant and pretentious title: Project of a universal science capable of raising our nature to the maximum level of perfection. The identity of nature and the cumulative character of knowledge became the basis of the theory of human progress. The French Enlightenment promoted an ideological unquestioning belief in progress, very utopian and abstract, viewed as the driving force in history and the destiny of humanity. In the second half of the 18th century, the golden age of Enlightenment, faith in progress permeated every field.

This faith in progress was spread in France by Turgot (1727-1781) and Condorcet (1743-1794), in Germany by Lessing (1729-1781), Herder (1744-1803) and Kant (1724-1804). It provoked much interest and enthusiasm. Voltaire (1694-1778), Diderot (1713-1784), Turgot and Condorcet promoted a positive progress guaranteed by “the power of reason, light from the human spirit” ( ENCYCLOPEDISM). Only a few recognized the alternating cycle of progress and decadence (undulating vision). For the majority of the authors, progress was continuous, homogenous and cumulative (linear vision). In the 17th century, the so-called religious wars caused religion to appear as the major obstacle to human progress (Voltaire). From the 18th century to the first half of the 19th century, these ideas conditioned the relationship between science and progress, even if other ideas existed, less publicized by followers of the Enlightenment. Bossuet (1627-1704), for example, in Discours sur l’histoire universelle (1681), proposed the Augustinian concept of progress as Providence. Others viewed it as spiritual, moral and cognitive growth. These last ideas, with different nuances and emphasis, even reached Kant and Hegel, but without having a particular development. Collapses in rational and positive optimism, tragic events, sudden changes and threats in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the suffering and desperation that resulted, were necessary to makes these ideas relevant again.

In modern times, nevertheless, Condorcet’s line of thinking, which theorized an experimental science of progress (without carrying it out however), prevailed.  Kant developed a theory of human progress and a law for human civilizations, in which cognitive progress facilitates overcoming the limits and shortcomings of the present and takes humanity toward its ultimate end. The task of practical-theoretical knowledge was to predict and orient destiny, while philosophy strengthened scientific thought and technical capacities with which human beings dominate nature and fulfil their freedom. History, therefore, was a continuous progression toward greater human freedom, while practical-political reason facilitated advancement toward necessary progress (cf. Ch. Wild, Die Funktion des Geschichtsbegriff im politischen Denken Kants, “Philosophische Jahrbuch” 77 (1970), pp. 260-275). In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1837) Hegel (1770-1831) emphasized the value of the historical conscience, indicated its directions and meaning, and legitimized the progress of humankind through natural sciences, technology and juridical institutions. These spheres of progress are the same ones indicated by French philosophers, from Turgot to Comte.

3. The Modern Age: Progress and Science. Similar excessive optimism over progress, its ways and instruments of dominion over history and natural forces, provoked significant critical reactions. The idea that progress calls for a scientific criticism of the philosophical reason was opposed to the contrasting one that progress requires a philosophical criticism of scientific rationality (cf. Oeing-Hanhoff, 1973-74). The latter became ever-more popular so that in the second half of the 19th century philosophical and historical criticism were able to concentrate on tasks, limits, methods and conditions of the exercise of scientific rationality. It brought to light the ambiguity and problematic nature of the concept of progress, no matter if it was understood in a general and global sense referred to human history or in a more specific meaning when referred to science and technology. In order to explore the relationship between progress and science, the thoughts, attitudes and judgements of the founders of modern science were revisited. The old historical studies had attributed to them precisely those ideas that now were criticized: the existence of a cumulative linear progress; scientific reason oriented toward defeating superstitions, religions, theology, risks and evils; the unstoppable and irreversible progress of the sciences as the necessary law of history; the temporary and surmountable character of all obstacles; the idea that nature can be completely dominated; unlimited creative capacity of man; science as the central value of universal history; science and scientific method as universal models of progress, etc.

New historical studies showed, in turn, that such attributions, were not sustainable, some of them being ideological and propagandistic or belonging to past times. However, they were not found in the works of greater scientists such as  Kepler,  Galilei,  Newton, or philosophers such as F. Bacon,  Boyle, Descartes,  Pascal,  Leibniz. They are found, rather, in ideological and political-social thought of the 19th century and in the positivists and idealists thinkers who, although they disagreed on everything, agreed on the “worship of progress”. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Proudhon (1809-1865) and Comte (1798-1857), fathers of sociological thought, were particularly against religion and preferred to substitute Christian faith in Providence with an unquestioning lay faith in progress. They applied the most rigid naturalistic determinism to human techno-scientific and social progress and supported methodological objectivism, the systematic exclusion of subjectivity and rigorous specialization. A little less than a century later, all these hypotheses would receive the most severe criticism from epistemology and from history of science. In the meantime, scientific culture promoted myths of unlimited progress and utopias of the definitive defeat of evils, pain, injustice and negativity.

Between the 18th-20th centuries, the idea of technological and scientific progress also drove the industrial revolution which succeeded in considering part of human “progress” also as one of the most artificial and superfluous need. Time was necessary to discover that these needs, being inexhaustible, irrational and coercive, would increasingly waste resources, energy and time. Technological and scientific progress put at the service of commerce and industry showed its radical ambiguity. On the one hand, the standard of living improved, overcoming illnesses, epidemics, limitations and other diseases which humanity would have not know how to overcome. On the other hand, the quality of life went down, with many negative side-affects: pollution of the air, water and ground; origin of illnesses and deaths “from civilization”; the waste of resources; the possible destruction of the world and humanity. Therefore, orientation and control were necessary. Modern industrial societies had other inequalities and injustices. In order to eliminate them, Karl Marx (1818-1883) theorized the laws of a necessary and unstoppable progress, intrinsic to the historical material development of the world. To help it carry into effect in history, marxism proclaimed itself the only holder of the scientific conscience and of its political and economic realization ( MATERIALISM, II).

4. The Contemporary Epoch: Irreversible Decline of the Idea of Progress. Darwinian evolution radically changed the idea of progress, understood as the advancement of history and humanity toward a desirable direction. It reduced it in turn to a casual, blind, endless event, devoid of worldly significance and historical meaning. In this way, it nullified the idea of rationality of the world and of history that had inspired modern science ( EVOLUTION, III). It jeopardized the original project of «discovering the truth in order to improve the future of humanity» (cf. Crombie, 1976, p. 35). As a consequence, Spencer (1820-1903) tried to recover the old sense of progress as the unlimited improvement of humanity through “social Darwinism”. From 1858, making the most fantastic extrapolations, he applied progressive rules to all human and social phenomena. (cf. Rossi, 1976, pp. 83-85). F. Engels (1820-1895) tried to integrate this scientific evolutionism with marxist ideas and human history, understood as purely “natural” history. These ideological hybrids, intensely publicized, became popular and supported the superficial image of a 19th century sign of progressivism. In this way, the end of the idea of progress began. In the philosophical terrain, Schopenhauer (1788-1860) denounced progress as an illusion or, worse still, as the fruit of an irrationality that would have produced catastrophes and evils for the entire planet.

In his work On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life (1874), F. Nietzsche (1844-1900) radically criticized the progressist mentality, from the Enlightenment to positivism. His anthropological ideas were then taken up again by the school of Frankfurt. Anthropological and ethnographic sciences refuted every optimism, progress and evolutionism. The criticisms of researchers, epistemologists, philosophers and historians of science became ever more acute and rigorous against the prejudice which identified science and progress. Philosophers such as Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey, Bergson, Husserl, Mounier, Heidegger, physicists and mathematicians such as Mach, Avenarius, Poincaré, Duhem, Einstein, Planck, Bohr and Born, and sociologists such as Weber, all denounced the scientism of dogmas such as absolute objectivity, neutrality, materiality, inevitable laws, mechanism, determinism, etc. The intellectual sciences recognized their own peculiarity, distancing themselves from natural sciences and refusing their presumed objectivity. The old Kantian faith in a constant and inevitable progress of the world and history faded in life, as well as in philosophical, historical, cultural, scientific and social debate.

III. The Epistemological Debate of the 20th Century

In the 20th century, the disturbing changes in the physical sciences, tragic questions that resulted from the “useless massacres” of world and national wars, the Jewish and nuclear holocaust, the occurrence of devastating economic crises, the subsequent cruel and tyrannical dictators and finally the Cold War, destroyed what remained of naive faith in progress. The general debate ended. This would have caused intellectuals to concentrate the attention on the progress of and in the sciences, in historical conditions and socio-cultural contexts which were now very different from the previous era. The world appeared afflicted by uncontrollable events that inspired dismay and pessimism. Scientific, technical, economic and industrial rationality were criticized and accused of oppressing people, violating nature, imposing the tyranny of machines. Themes of alienation, marginalization, restriction and the suppression of freedom, loss of values, purpose and meaning, and survival replaced themes of progress. Modernity was accused of bringing about a “new barbarism.” The old positivist-rationalist identification of science with progress survived in the media, as well as in the schools and in part in common language. Criticisms of technological and scientific activities and companies increased, judging them negative for the planet and “regressive” for the human species .

The relationship between the progress of science and the human condition focused on the question of whether science could be called progress in and of itself or, rather, only with respect to general human progress. Faced by scientific knowledge that was greater, more ample and rigorous with respect to the past, it became natural to ask what progress consisted of and how to evaluate it. The debate moved from a general and hypothetical progress of science to a more concrete and specific progress in science. This discussion, much more interesting and complex, is still in full development and will be examined in the following sections. The change in mentality, ideas, topics and problems, due to more than a century and a half of debate on progress, can be understood by confronting two significant affirmations. The first one comes from the philosopher of the Enlightenment M.J. de Condorcet in his work Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’espirit humain (1792-1793): «The time will come in which on earth the sun will shine only on free men who do not recognize above them another man except for reason, since tyrants and slaves, priests and their obtuse and hypocritical instruments will exist only in history books or in scenes in a play». The second one comes from the contemporary physicist M. Born, Nobel Prize for physics (1954), according to whom «the sciences of nature have destroyed, perhaps forever, the ethical foundations of civilization» (Erinnerung und Gedanken eines Physikers, “Universitas” 23 (1968), p. 273). Both speak for themselves.

1. Scientific Progress as an Epistemological Problem. The second of the two following citations expresses the spirit that animated the debate on scientific progress in the second half of the 20th century, Once the great visions of the historical future of humanity were put aside, the concrete epistemological and juridical aspects of scientific activity became the issues to focus on. The semantic components of the idea of progress were also specified: “advancement”, “change”, “improvement”. Advancement does not necessarily mean changing for the better or improving. For example, diseases advance but they worsen one’s health (regression). Similarly, change does not mean advancement. For example, progress, regression and alternate decline are found everywhere, even in science. The terms, “improvement” and “better” imply a judgement of value that is not necessarily of an ethical nature ( ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC WORK). That being stated, it was notable that progress could not presume or postulate but always required epistemological proof and evaluations that are not “mathematical measurements.” With this, dogmatisms on the “linear and cumulative progress” of science declined; so the one about the substantial union between the “truth of facts” (empirical component) and “explanations” (theoretical component); the one on the irrefutability of scientific truths and on linear and homogenous progress of knowledge. The new formulation required, above all, new ways and criteria to evaluate “internal progress”. Their research, in its time, raised new problems of the foundation of science, its conceptual outlooks, its value of truth, its methodological validity ( EPISTEMOLOGY). These problems, although they did not have to do directly with the contents, data, explanations or cognitive value, nevertheless strongly influence them.

The growing complexity of knowledge calls for a greater awareness of reliability, a logical and methodological value of data, concepts, principles, etc. The criteria to verify these internal aspects, however, cannot be done at an “internal” level, rather it must happen on a “meta-theoretical” one, where the need for comprehension makes it even more difficult to evaluate progress. This difficulty becomes greater, in the end, on a metaphysical level, when different explanations of the facts are put together through few fundamental concepts. This is the case of those, for example, who wanted to explain every physical process with matter and movement ( MECHANICS, IV). Mach and Einstein demonstrated, however, that this was a metaphysical prejudice (cf. Agazzi, 1976, pp. 93-96) . The need for meta-theoretical and metaphysical internal criteria, therefore makes the evaluation of internal cognitive sciences of science or in science uncertain. The evaluation of the progress of science in relationship to other fields (ethical, social, practical, political, etc.) requires, however, a different comparison among different activities, taken individually or all together. In such a case, the criteria to evaluate an activity in the perspective of global human progress must be concerned with the good and authentic utility of people, society and culture. It has already been seen that the modern debate demonstrated that the historical progress of a continuous global human nature in all sectors did not exist. That which may appear as progress for a single sector or science, could be regression for other fields (ethics, society, culture, politics, etc.) or on the whole, when evaluated on the basis of criteria internal to that specific sector.

The connection of internal criteria of a sub-system to that of other sub-systems and of an entire systems, is never spontaneous or automatic, but problematic, requiring acute critical discernment. The shift from values and cognitive criteria to deontological values requires new and adequate modes of expression. The progress and regression of science, therefore, are evaluated based on the requirements and general values of the global system. Specific requirements of other sub-systems, in order of their importance and significance for the effective good of the people, society and culture, are also taken into account. All this is indispensable and decisive in order to completely evaluate every progress. The experience of history, epistemological criticism and philosophical reflections confirm that, in globally evaluating progress, no legitimate criterion (internal, meta-theoretical, metaphysical, external deontological or social) can be eliminated. Evaluation involves various steps.

The first is to consider internal progress in science. This progress distinguishes every discipline from other fields, without separating it while evaluating its reciprocal relations. Every science has the right to evaluate its own progress based on cognitive criteria, placing the cognitive value as its criterion of progress. This is what the encyclical Gaudium et spes recognizes as the development of knowledge according to the legitimate autonomy of science (cf. n. 36; cf. also Discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 31.10.1992, n. 13). It does not justify, however, the right to make an absolute value supreme or superior to every other value. It is also not accurate to identify (or confuse) progress in science with the progress of science. In the second phase, the scale of values relative to people, society and culture must be established. Science cannot decide this scale and must respect it. In the third step, scientific activity and its consequences must be placed in the context of a global system of values that judges them and evaluates the results (progress or regression). The deontological scales seem the most appropriate to contextualize values, harmonizing their “optimal” configurations. In this systemic context, optimal means maximum realization of the most important values, through the maximum realization of subordinate values. The metaphysical principles do not hinder such a realization or the internal logic of the scientific dialogue, nor do they exclude initially some category or image of the world. The defining characteristic of  metaphysics, its search for truth, is in fact the non-stop and in-depth critical examination of all principles — these one and those of every field, in the light of basic principles and of the ultimate end and values, being the staring point.

2. 1960-1970: The Comparison between Fundamentalism and Skepticism. Until the 60’s and 70’s these ideas had to fight against dogmatisms of linear, homogeneous and cumulative scientific progress. Before Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) presented science as a rather shaky structure with little coherence among the different parts and as a riddle (cf. Kuhn, 1964), the undisputed and dominating idea of science was that of a harmonious structure with solid and irreplaceable foundations, in constant and ordered growth from one truth to another. The theoretical systems appeared as the result of fundamental data, according to specific categories and stable norms of rational evaluation. Moreover some philosophers established some criteria to evaluate scientific progress: the cognitive dignity of a theory (Ayer’s principle of verifiability); a measure of its power of explanation (Hempel’s systemic capability of science); the measure of its level of confirmation (Carnap’s logical analysis). Nevertheless, attempts at applying them failed, pushing historians of science to define them as a caricature of the real development of science (cf. Cohen, 1976, p. 108), ideas and images that did not hold up any more. The question involved all the problems of “unicity” and of the “constant advancement” of scientific progress. Positivist and scientist “fundamentalisms” had oversimplified the problems of the comparison among different scientific theories and the problems of scientific rationality. Therefore, the reaction was so strong that Kuhn denied the possibility of any comparison between them because of their difference in standards and objectives, Feyerabend (1924-1994) also denied it based on the incompatibility of their languages. This however opened the way for skepticism.

Yet a deeper reflection demonstrated that both fundamentalists and skeptics had at their bases the same prejudice of considering scientific problems not easily influenced by historical circumstances or cultural changes existed.  Popper (1902-1994) recognized the importance of these factors for progress in science but in overly generic terms. Not applying limits to the provisional character of accumulated knowledge in its “world-3” and renouncing to any requirement of coherence, Popper ended up by even admitting contradictory conjectures. In this way, there were no criteria to make up generality and uniformity of rational principles with particularity and mutability of problems, of criteria and scientific data. To overcome this situation, Toulmin (born 1922) hypothesized a “Darwinian” idea of progress, which immediately revealed itself as generic and inconsistent. Lakatos (1922-1974) claimed that the search for criteria to distinguish the scientific hypotheses from those that are not scientific (criterion of demarcation) was inseparable from the search for distinguishing the best and worst hypotheses (criterion of preference). He would scold Popper for addressing only singular hypotheses instead of addressing their ensembles or sequences. Ultimately, he defined progress as “an ever deeper understanding” about an area of nature, rather than “ever more precise information” gained at the same level.

He forgot, however, that the theme of scientific progress had to do with values, not facts. In addition, historians of science demonstrated that many real sequences did not conform to Lakatos’ framework, so that scientific progress could not be evaluated. At the other extreme, mathematicians and physicists wanted to “measure it”. As they did not find a direct way of doing so, they proposed departing from the redundancy of empirical data in order to then eliminate redundancy progressively through codes. They admitted, however, that quantitative evaluation contains a hypothetical and complex itinerary, whose duration is difficult to predict, as its path is full of obstacles and difficulties. Others admitted not even knowing where to start and could only hope for the day to accomplish it. The doubts and contradictions on the possibility of confronting different scientific theories, raised in the 60’s and 70’s, came up again in the 80’s and 90’s, when they tried to focus on the problem of “commensurability” and examine it according to some new views.

3. 1980-1990: The Semantic Views beyond Fundamentalism and Skepticism. I will examine two of these views. The first one moves from the idea that the only criterion to verify the truth of a scientific theory is its “applicability” or “technical ability to be reproducible”. The link between theoretical mediation (symbolic) and the technical ability to be reproducible (technical and scientific apparatuses) reveal the hermeneutic dimension of science — thus making it possible to distinguish the latter from other knowledges and preventing it from being diluted in an indistinct universal hermeneutics of knowledge ( HERMENEUTICS, VIII). Epistemology cannot determine if these theories are, “by law”, incompatible or not. It can only assert that in a given moment of scientific development, it is not yet able to: a) make conceptual, instrumental or technical correlations among theories; b) choose between incompatible hypotheses, not being able to translate into a technical and operative method, their conceptual mediations. With respect to the debated proposals among Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin, etc., this formulation means a) accepting scientific theories as descriptions of aspects and real levels of the real world; b) rejecting “fallibility” that deems all the old theories false. These theories remained true even if they were replaced by others having a greater depth, thus avoiding incompatibility which leads to epistemological relativism and simply replaces concepts, theories and instruments, rather than making progress. In this way a merely cumulative progress is avoided, that is a progress lacking conceptual links among subsequent acquired results.

This vision of the progress of scientific theories can be summarized in this way: a) the variations of meaning and reference remain closely connected to each other and to the technical apparatuses (instruments) that guarantee reproduce-ability of the experimental results; b) such variations show progress, only if they provoke greater semantic and referential determination in the passage from one theory to another; c) such greater determination must be closely connected to the possibility of working technically on reality. The hermeneutic conception of progress shows that scientific knowledge is a kind of “spiral” where old applications (of terms, concepts, theories, methodological principles, etc.) are essential to understand new applications, which reinterpret with their views/perspectives the preceding applications and understanding. This “hermeneutic spiral” facilitates understanding scientific progress as long as it allows for judging best the scientific theory that is able to unite the others into a coherent compilation and to connect them in an intelligible historical perspective. It must explain in a new way not only nature but also the preceding way of understanding it (cf. MacIntyre, 1980, pp 69-73). The “technical reproduce-ability” distinguishes empirical sciences from the history of sciences. When comparison between theories is possible, the better theory is that which creates a better synthesis, both in the history of science and in technical applications (cf. Buzzoni, 1995, pp. 92, 207, 220-227).

The second view is somewhat similar to the previous one, but it poses the problem in different terms. It does not pretend to be definitive but it tries to link the qualitative philosophical and epistemological dimension to the most profound cultural and existential needs. I will present these differences following Giovanni Boniolo’s model (Metodo e rappresentazioni del mondo [Method and representations of the world], 1999). Such a view considers every theory that becomes coherent and satisfying in the moment in which it is formulated as sufficient (cf. ibidem, pp. 6-11). Science, in fact, as every human expression, is understandable only if it is connected to everyday life (Lebenswelt). Having started by saying that regressive and progressive philosophical thought can be discussed not in a global sense but in a local one, the author considers the  logic as indispensable but insufficient. Deductive reasoning is valid only for “scientific theories”, not for the “scientific dynamic” which requires in turn the argumentative form. According to Boniolo, these introductions should avoid blind alleys of previous disputes between Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and others (cf. ibidem, pp. 23, 39, 59-60). The problem of scientific progress would be resolved, then, through notions of: “semantizing area”, “intentional network” and “real network”. The semantizing area would be the sum of the rules synthesized by the concept and sufficient of capturing its meaning. The broader this area, the more it allows for the profound understanding of the concept’s meanings. This area, nevertheless, with respect to the enormous complexity of concepts, always remains a very reduced portion of the properties that pertain to the various cognitive levels of the subject. Therefore, it can only be grasped within a cognitive network.

For this reason different concepts of “network” must be introduced. The “intentional network” is the interlace of the intentional properties, whose nodes are represented by the intentional entities; “real network” is the interlace of real properties, in which nodes are the real entities (cf. ibidem, pp. 337-339). In order to get to know an object, therefore, a concept is necessary with which to define it and a semantizing area is necessary in which to place it. That is sufficient for the intentional entities. For real entities, on the other hand, experimental procedures are also required. To know the intentional entity, therefore means to build the same relations existing among the elements of the conceptual level into the elements of the intentional level. To know what is real implies imposing on what is real a subcategory of intentional relations, among intentional entities, so that real relations are constructed among real entities. Every theory, therefore, is a portion of a conceptual network or a part of an interdependent realm. As a result, the construction of a new scientific theory (new portion) never totally replaces the old theory, nor it requires its fading away. As we do not know single facts, but only their structural wholeness in a given way, we must always start from the structures in which they are represented. If such structures are not enough, we must reorder them, in order to adapt them to the complete empirical situation (cf. ibidem, pp. 341-347). There is only true “advancement” of empirical knowledge only when an effective change in the set of the concepts of “property” brings an effective change in the set of the concepts of “entity”.

That means that some concepts which were previously present are not any longer, while others that were absent before now are present. Representations revealed to be totally inadequate to represent reality will be remembered only on the historical level. When it comes to reality, every theory elaborates some aspects or determines some “knots” that other theories cannot develop in the same way. This approach to the problem no longer looks at the theories and scientific representations like simple formulations turned to group and order together the known empirical results, but it looks at them like «cognitive meanings to show, semantically and inter-subjectively, determinate aspects of reality» (ibidem, pp. 375—377). This explains the distinction between the epistemological aspect and the gnoseological one. Entities and physical objects are not a reality in themselves. Under the epistemological aspect they are models, thus not real; on the other hand, under the gnoseological aspect they are knots of real properties representing aspects of reality, which observation makes meaningful. Epistemologically speaking, theories exist in order to make regular the aspects of irregular reality (treated by rules); whereas, gnoseologicallay speaking, they are used to render significant a part of reality. Theories that propose entities as “non-observable in principle” are criticized. Those that propose entities as “non-observable because of technological reasons”, will either remain uncertain forever or become verifiable, directly or indirectly (through effects) (cf. ibidem, pp. 380-384). Unable to predict with certainty the future developments of the debate when addressed in the present terms, and continuing some conflicting views on the debate as introduced in the previous terms, additional in-depth studies and reflections must be carried out.

IV. Three Centuries of Debate on Progress: Reflections and Observations

The elements that emerged in the long discussion on progress, whether understood in a general or specific sense, help us highlight the more important aspects of the relationship between science and faith. First of all, it is clear that in the general idea of progress there are many prejudices. Among them are the following: the secular conceptions of history according to which religions are superstitions (Voltaire) and sciences and technology are the unique factors capable to improve humanity (Encyclopédie); the ideas of the absolute superiority of European civilization (late Enlightenment); the view that general progress of humanity grows just because of specific progress in any field (Condorcet); the development of the human spirit from religion to philosophy, and then to science (Turgot, Comte); evolution seen as the greatest expression of progress (Spencer). Such concessions and ideas produced a vision of progress as universal, unilateral, cumulative, unlimited improvement, which extended to all intellectual, moral, cultural, social and material conditions of humankind and its history. In the 18th century, such a view was still flexible and balanced, while in the first half of the 19th century it was taken as the rigid law which should lead human evolution toward greatest well-being and happiness. From the middle of the 19th century this dogmatic rigidity was the object of ever-more severe criticism that contributed to its abandonment.

In addition the debate on progress, in conjunction with the development of science, greatly affected the image and understanding of the latter. General problems regarding human history, and specific problems regarding science (foundation, presuppositions, rigor and truthfulness of data, concepts, theories, methods, etc.) undeservedly overlapped. With respect to epistemological reflection and historical research in science, however, they represented the internal and specific problems relevant for a better understanding of progress. They had to be tackled before the generic problems, or they had to be clearly distinguished from them. A serious discussion on questions such as the truthfulness of scientific knowledge, the canons for its verification, its character of public and democratic knowledge, the reliability of science as rational dominion over the world and the conquest of nature should have been developed. In the way, pseudo-problems such as the superiority of the modern over the old, the specific diversity of every historical epoch, the question on the general destiny of humanity – they all extraneous to the debate on science, and somewhat inconclusive – would have been avoided or properly re-arranged. Moreover, it is clear that until the middle of the 19th century the critical debate on science was extremely limited and guided by inadequate philosophies. Only the decline of Enlightenment and the fading of rationalist and positivist beliefs made it possible to see the inconsistency of the idea of a continuous and homogeneous progress of the whole of humanity. The loss of interest in the problem of the “generic approach” allowed critical epistemology and the history of science, which had matured, to posit the specific problem of progress within science.

Today the number of scientists and philosophers who are competent in epistemological problems seems to grow. In physics, for example, there is a greater awareness of the difficulty of reaching definitive results and global, unified theories. In all fields, many retain that uncertainties will never be lacking and that progress consists above all in debating once again previous certainties. In all sciences, it is still considered that when they thought they had reached a certain point, it was then discovered that the reality of the matter was different. As a result, definitive answers should not be expected and science appears to be a continuous process, certainly capable of learning about certain immutable aspects of reality, but always ready for further exploration and less sure of those that it considered absolute certainties. Regarding the progress of scientific theories it is noted that the criteria of a good theory – simplicity, elegance, ability to be verified, unifying power – are almost never able to be satisfied all together, remaining purely regulatory ideals. In  cosmology, it is recognized that we cannot receive information from the earliest moments of the cosmos and that cosmologies that postulate the existence of many universes, whose distances overcome the light-time corresponding to the age of our universe, belong more to the realm of speculations than science ( IDEALISM, IV. 3; MANY-WORLDS MODELS, III).

Regarding the relationship between scientific activity and personal, cultural and social progress, there is still the need for a satisfactory gnoseological, heuristic and ethical reflection. If such a reflection is adequately developed, it will result very different from what was found during the Modern Age, which I have examined in brief. It will constitute a primary commitment for this new century and millennium. Yet, at a deeper level, Christian faith and thought bring about many useful elements. These I will explain now, after some historical and theoretical clarifications.

V. The Concept of “Progress” According to the Documents of the Roman Catholic Church

Firstly, with respect to ecclesiastical documents, we must also distinguish the meanings of the notion of “progress”: if taken in a general way in terms of history or in a specific way in terms of science. Furthermore, we must place various documents in their exact cultural context. In the documents before the Second Vatican Council, the term “progress” did not frequently appear. Among these documents, it was above all the clause n. 80 of Syllabus (Pius IX, 8.12.1864) that was read by some as the “opposition of Catholicism to progress” (cf. Angelini, 1982, p. 1222). Actually, the condemned clause affirmed: «The Roman Pontiff can and must be reconciled and agree with progress, liberalism and modern culture» (DH 2980). Therefore, it had to do with “progress in the general sense”, as it was understood by liberalism and by contemporary culture which in those years, however, began to already be criticized and refuted by some authors. Regarding “progress in the specific sense”, that is scientific progress, already in the letter to the archbishop of Munich, titled Tuas libenter (21.12.1863), Pius IX had rejected the accusation that the Apostolic See was opposed to science (DH 2875). A similar idea in Syllabus (cf. DH 2912, 2913) confirmed it again, and recognized the value of science and of its progress. Criticisms and reservations of the Catholic magisterium concerned the idea of generalized progress. that looked ambiguous, and which, in those years, many renowned thinkers began to discuss and criticize, as I have shown in the previous sections.

In the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius, Vatican Council I (1970) rejected the idea that dogmas must change according to scientific progress (cf. DH 3043). In so doing it wished to emphasize that Catholic doctrine always refused the possibility of an objective conflict between faith and reason (cf. DH 3004-3005). This also applies to the decree Lamentabili (3.7.1907) in which Pius X rejected the idea of having to adjust Christian doctrine on God,  creation, Revelation, on the Word incarnate and on redemption, to the progress of science (cf. DH 3463-3465). What these texts primarily refused was the error of  concordism and the “confusion of planes” between the discourses of faith and that of science. If read correctly, they anticipate in some way the view of contemporary epistemology that considers scientific acquisitions partial, provisory and revisable. They did not dispute scientific progress but they questioned its undeserved interpretations, which would be rejected a century later by the same lay way of thinking. In various documents of its, the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) extensively examined the themes related to progress. The term appears in many places: see for instance the documents Ad gentes 12; Apostolicam actuositatem 1, 4, 7; Gravissimum educationis 1, 3, 8, 11, 12; Inter mirifica 2, 5, 12, 13; Nostra aetate 2; Presbyterorum ordinis 17, 19; Gaudium et spes 4-7, 9; 20, 23, 35, 37, 39, 56-57, 62, 64, 73; Lumen gentium 65.

The text of Gaudium et spes examines the various aspects of progress with greater depth. After considering the gap between temporal organization and spiritual progress (n. 4) and between technical-scientific mentality and many ways of thinking of human culture (n. 5), it purports that economic progress alone does not improve people, nor their relationships. It does not directly bring about, therefore, justice and fraternity, but it can give them a material base (nn. 6, 35). The denial of God ( ATHEISM) and of  religion can be supported by certain technical and scientific progress, but, above all, it comes from philosophy and ideology (nn. 7, 20). Human history testifies not only progress but also regression (n. 9). Human progress, therefore, if it favors relations, fraternal dialogue, spiritual dignity and community life, is valuable to mankind and can facilitate human happiness (n. 37). It remains, however, subject to the temptations of power and influence, vanity, malice, and egotism. Therefore, progress cannot be confused with the advent of the Kingdom of God, even if it may promote the good of society. The relationship between progress, culture, science and technology is especially considered on nn. 56-57 of the same document. Technological and scientific progress means other than knowing the “intimate notions of things”. They are not the same, and the former cannot lead to the latter. Scientific and technological progress offers, however, important positive values for scientific culture such as: interest in science, rigorous fidelity to the truth, need to collaborate with other scientists, international solidarity, awareness of one’s own responsibilities, improvement of human living conditions. Scientific progress is also fundamental for economic development oriented to the service of man (n. 64) and for social and cultural development raised to the common good (n. 73). In the texts that have been cited up till now the term “progress” is indicated explicitly while in many other texts its contents and descriptions are not expressed. The most significant description presents it as «the labor to better the circumstances of human life through a monumental amount of individual and collective effort» (n. 34). This definition is valid for any form of progress, no matter how it is understood: historical and human or scientific, in a global and general sense or in a specific or particular sense, due to contributions of general kind or to specific contributions of science and technology. This is indeed far from the excesses and exaggerations which were proper to the 18th and 19th centuries, allowing realistic and positive further examination. The view of progress found in this document is consistent with that positive approach already expressed by the great social encyclicals, from Rerum Novarum (Leo XIII, 15.5.1891) to Centesimus annus (John Paul II, 1.5.1991) which confronted in a constructive way the problems of economic and social progress.

In regards to progress in science and technology, the most recent documents by John Paul II have emphasized the great richness that this constitutes for the entire modern world remembering, nevertheless, that science and technology alone cannot explain the transcendental origin and the ultimate end of human existence. They must, therefore, keep in mind the metaphysical and moral questions that have been rendered ever-more alive and urgent by them; in fact, certain scientific knowledge needs to be compared with the whole truth on human person. In such cases, it is necessary to avoid contradictions between scientific observation and the “complete” truth about human nature, overcoming the temptation of considering scientific explanations as exhaustive and all-encompassing. The “myth” of progress must not lead to think that all research or any application are, as such, morally good, without properly weighing the authentic good that these discoveries bring to both the physical and spiritual dimensions of human being (cf. Discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Science, 28.10.1994, nn. 2-3, 5). The scientific community is committed to maintain the right ranking of values, situating the scientific aspects in the field of an integral humanism, that takes into account all the dimensions (metaphysical, ethical, social and juridical) that are perceived by human conscience. When dealing with the human person, the problems go beyond the field of science; science cannot explain human transcendence, nor can it rule the moral laws based on the recognition of the centrality and dignity of the person in the universe. It is up to the entire human community to promote a humanistic and anthropologic integrated view (cf. ibidem, nn. 5-6, 9).

VI. Scientific Progress and the Relationship between Science and Faith

These clarifications are essential in order to thoroughly examine the problems of progress in terms of the relationship between science and faith. We have seen that the cultural climate was cleared up once the lay way of thinking recognized the inconsistency and impossibility of the general, continuous and constant progress of history, humanity and science. The charges of hindering progress addressed against Christian faith and the Church, and the consequent sense of guilt and inferiority felt by some believers, resulted to be unfounded. The criticisms and resistance that Christianity made when asking for a deeper understanding of what progress really meant were, on the contrary, legitimate and motivated. Perhaps they had to be even more vigorous because they were able to guide the debate on progress in and of science in the right direction and toward more realistic forms of thought. Presently, two of these forms appear more valid and important. The first is the invitation extended to epistemology, philosophy and the history of science to always focus their attention on the specific and internal elements of scientific activity. The object and scope of this attention is the comparison between hypotheses, theories, methods, logic and models, in order to evaluate those that are preferable, and the reasons for this preference. These are problems “internal” to science. For purely scientific aspects they involve specialized scientists, while for metaphysical aspects, they involve epistemology, philosophy and the history of science.

In various fields, the problems have not been completely resolved. As a result, there are, and perhaps there will always be, different and conflicting positions. While the old idealist, positivist and neo-positivist ideas have been surpassed, the conventionalist and instrumentalist conceptions of science and progress still remain alive in the interdisciplinary debate. These conceptions should be corrected, integrated and replaced. In fact, the greatest risk is that they might bring about forms of relativism and skepticism, which are shared and spread by post-modern thought. There is also another more general aspect of the problem: the value of truth and the meaning of scientific “conscience” (juridical, hermeneutic and gnoseological), as well as the ethical and moral value of scientific “activity” (as an ethical and social problem). These problems are no longer purely internal to science, as they also involve ethical, cultural and social dimensions and implications. Their solution, therefore, cannot be solely attributed to scientists, epistemologists and historians of science, since it requires an explanation far too extensive and articulated that calls for philosophers, moralists and theologians ( CULTURE, ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC WORK; TECHNOLOGY). Also in this regard, Christian thought and Church documents offer useful guidelines. They are more and more interested in the problem of the truth of many discoveries and applications (biology, bio-genetics, etc.) which are directly related to the human person, freedom, thoughts and actions ( BIOETHICS). These discoveries and applications shed light on the need to respect everything involving the human sphere to facilitate a more harmonious development of societies and cultures. Thus, the Roman Catholic documents usually demand that the theories mentioned as the basis of the new problems must respond to the standards of scientific reliability. In other word, they must have dependable and solid grounds. It is also critical to discern what, in a determined field or in a given stage of science, can be considered acquired, still affected by probability, or even imprudent and unreasonable, and therefore worth to be rejected (cf. John Paul II, Discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 31.10.1992, n. 13).

With regard to human development, John Paul II has highlighted two aspects. The first one concern the “horizontality” of human being and of creation (culture, research, technology, etc.). The second one has to do with “verticalness”, or rather what is higher in depth, what gives meaning to our existence and actions. It concerns what is between our origin and our end, that which transcends us and draws us to the Creator. These two dimensions are not always uniform, straight or harmonious. Nevertheless both are necessary to us and should be handled carefully. The certified comprehensibility of research and discoveries in science, but also technological inventions and innovations, do not show the world as a chaos but rather as a cosmos. A reality that is ordered and lawful, from which it is possible to learn and understand. It goes back to that «transcendent and primordial Thought imprinted on all things» (cf. Discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences , 31.10.1992, in Papal Addresses, p. 343) . This way of thinking gives full meaning to a discussion on “human” progress, if it regards the good that can serve the true human happiness and points out the evil that threatens humankind, when pursuing power, vanity and malice (cf. Gaudium et spes, n. 37). A profound anthropological, ethical and moral reflection is thus necessary. When it regards the great hopes but also emphasizes the numerous antinomies having difficult solution which I have analyzed up in the previous sections, the discussion on “cultural” progress becomes more meaningful.

Above all, there is the danger that human beings, placing their faith and confidence solely in science and technology, may think that all this is sufficient unto themselves and no longer seek the higher things (cf. ibidem, nn. 56-57). It also gives credibility to the discussion on “scientific” progress, if it regards research which truly conforms to all those juridical and moral demands which I have indicated above. There will never be a true contrast among these conditions for an authentic progress (along all these dimensions), the genuine demands of progress made by human society and by our quest for truth, and the demand of religious faith (cf. ibidem, n. 36). Some passages from the Catechism of the Catholic Church appear to point out properly, in their different aspects, the present state of the problem (cf. nn. 2293-2294). They serve also as a deeper reflection on the authentic progress of science, technology and culture.

The first of the two points says: «Basic scientific research, as well as applied research, is a significant expression of man's dominion over creation. Science and technology are precious resources when placed at the service of man and promote his integral development for the benefit of all. By themselves however they cannot disclose the meaning of existence and of human progress. Science and technology are ordered to man, from whom they take their origin and development; hence they find in the person and in his moral values both evidence of their purpose and awareness of their limits» (CCC 2293). The second point adds: «It is an illusion to claim moral neutrality in scientific research and its applications. On the other hand, guiding principles cannot be inferred from simple technical efficiency, or from the usefulness accruing to some at the expense of others or, even worse, from prevailing ideologies. Science and technology by their very nature require unconditional respect for fundamental moral criteria. They must be at the service of the human person, of his inalienable rights, of his true and integral good, in conformity with the plan and the will of God» (CCC 2294). These points well sum up the meaning of authentic progress that respects, without confusion, the exigencies of faith, science, humanity and culture.

Gualberto Gismondi
(translated by Susan Pinto)

See also: CULTURE; EPISTEMOLOGY; HERMENEUTICS; ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC WORK; ETHICS AND DEVELOPMENT; HISTORY.

Documents of the Catholic Church related to the subject:

Bibliography

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