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 Dialogue,
Science and Theology
Robert J. Russell
I. Typologies: Ways of Relating Science and
Religion - II. Critical realism: the original “bridge” between science
and religion - III. Further developments in methodology - IV. Anti-reductionism
- V. Ontological implications - VI. Summary of critical realism
and open issues.
It is fitting to commence this essay with these words from John
Paul II: «The church and the scientific community will inevitably
interact; their options do not include isolation. [...] Science
can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify
science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other
into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish. [...] We
need each other to be what we must be, what we are called to be»
(John Paul II, Letter to Director of the Vatican Observatory , 1.6.1988, in Papal Addresses , p. 300). We begin with the question of methodology:
how are we to relate theology and science? I will take the question
as broadly including issues in epistemology and the nature of scientific
and religious language, as well as issues more clearly arising in
methodology per se. The past four decades have seen a variety of
important such methodological proposals; here we’ll briefly review
some of the most promising. I believe we’ll see that, though they
differ significantly on key questions, they still form a somewhat
continuous developmental path, leading from early insights to cutting
edge research questions.
I. Typologies: Ways of Relating Science and Religion
A number of typologies have been suggested to classify various
ways of relating science and religion. We will start with a brief
review of them, since they illuminate the underlying assumptions
often taken for granted which strongly shape the public as well
as scholarly conversations. They can be quite useful both to specialists
wishing to clarify subtle distinctions between positions and to
non-specialists, including the media, educators, and clergy, by
providing a basic orientation to the field. In some cases these
ways are meant as mutually exclusive, such as “conflict” versus
“two worlds”; in other cases, one way might lead to and become incorporated
within another, such as “dialogue” and “integration.” In some cases,
each way is meant as a characterization of the relation between
science per se and religion per se; in other cases, they only apply
to specific topics in science and in religion.
Ian Barbour’s typology, called «ways of
relating science and religion», was first published in 1988 (cf. Ways
of Relating Science and Theology, in Russell et al. (eds.),
1988, pp. 21-48), expanded slightly in 1990 and in 1997, and used to
restructure the material from his 1990 Gifford lectures for a wider
audience in 2000 (cf. Barbour, 1990, ch. 1; 1997, ch. 4; 2000). It
remains the most widely used typology in the field. Barbour lists
four types of relations, each with subtypes: “conflict” (scientific
materialism, biblical literalism); “independence” (contrasting
methods, differing languages); “dialogue” (boundary questions,
methodological parallels); and “integration” (natural theology,
theology of nature, systematic synthesis). His rich discussion is
essential reading.
The 1980s saw other typologies, though they
were less widely effective. In 1981 Arthur Peacocke published an
eightfold typology (cf. The
Science and Theology in the Twentieth Century, Notre Dame 1981,
pp. XIII-XV). It listed both differences and similarities in realms,
approaches, languages, attitudes, and objects; it also allowed for
the integration of science and religion and for science to generate
a metaphysics in which theology can be formulated. I later
reformulated his typology as a four-dimensional model which allows
for a continuum between opposite positions (cf. Russell, 1985; Peacocke,
1993, pp. 20-21). In 1985, Nancey Murphy appropriated H. Richard
Niebuhr’s classic five-fold typology of relations between
Christianity and culture and applied it to science and religion. Her
distinctive claim was that theology could be a transformer not only
of culture in general but even of science in particular (cf. Murphy,
1985).
In the 1990's, a variety of new topologies
appeared, many responding directly to Barbour’s work. John
Haught’s 1995 typology includes conflict, contrast, contact, and
confirmation (cf. Haught, 1995). The first three parallel those of
Barbour; the fourth describes theology as providing some key
philosophical assumptions underlying science. These include such
“fiduciary” assumptions, that the universe is rational, coherent,
ordered, whole, and grounded in love and promise ( Natural
Laws, II.2). In Haught’s (somewhat misleading) formulation,
the term “confirmation” is not used to mean that science
confirms theology ( Concordism). Haught
then addresses nine key issues in science and religion and
illustrates how each of his four approaches respond to them. In
1996, Willem B. Drees offered a nine-fold typology generated as
three new realities (new scientific knowledge, new ideas in
philosophy of science, and new attitudes towards nature) influence
three distinct areas (religious cognitive claims, experiences, and
traditions; cf. Drees, 1996, pp. 39-53; for an earlier, nascent
version, see Drees, 1990, ch. 5). According to Drees, Barbour’s
typology deals with the interaction between religious cognitive
claims and new scientific knowledge. In his six-fold typology,
Philip Hefner includes the infusion of religious wisdom into
scientific concepts, the construction of new metaphysical systems
for science and the evangelical reaffirmation of traditional
religious rationality. While writing on the doctrine of creation in
1991, Anne Clifford developed a detailed typology for the relations
principally between Roman Catholic theology and the natural sciences,
including continuity, separation, and interaction (cf. Clifford,
1991).
Ted Peters’ 1998 eight-fold typology includes several refinements
to Barbour’s scheme. He first distinguishes between “scientific
materialists”, who claim that science supports atheism,
and “scientific imperialists”, who claim that science offers a path
to God but, like scientific materialists,
argue that science alone produces genuine knowledge. He also distinguishes
between Roman Catholic “ecclesiastical authoritarianism”, which
stretched from the nineteenth century until Vatican II and sought
clerical control over secular knowledge, and twentieth century “scientific
creationism”, a form of Protestant fundamentalism which sees itself
as genuine science though it is based on a literal reading of Genesis.
Peters’ typology also includes ethical overlap, New
Age spirituality and what Peters advocates, “hypothetical consonance”.
Mark Richardson’s recent three-fold typology illuminates the striking
difference in literary genre between: intellectual/rational texts
(in which the laws of science reveal the mind of God); romantic/affective
& aesthetic/mystical texts (here science reunites us with nature
as sacred); and tradition-centered texts (where scientific theories
are integrated into the systematic theologies of world religions;
cf. Bube, 1995; Worthing, 1996; Stenmark, 1997; Watts, 1998). Many
other books and articles suggest relevant typologies of approaches
to, relations between, and goals and aims for the interaction; a
particularly helpful resource is the very recent textbook edited
by Christopher Southgate and colleagues (1998).
II. Critical Realism: The Original “Bridge” Between Science and
Religion
In his ground-breaking 1966 publication, Issues in Science and
Religion, Ian G. Barbour laid out a series of well-crafted arguments
involving issues in epistemology (the kinds of knowledge we have),
language (how it is expressed), and methodology (how it is obtained
and justified). Together these arguments provided the “bridge” between
science and religion which has, more than any other work, made possible
the developments of the past four decades. He has explored these
arguments in detail since then, principally through his 1990 Gifford
Lectures, together with their revisions in 1997and 2000. Barbour’s
pioneering vision continues to bear much of the now burgeoning flow
of traffic (cf. D. Griffin, 1988; H. Rolston III, 1992). From the
outset, Barbour used the term “critical realism” to stand for the
specific set of arguments he developed in 1966 (cf. Barbour, 1966,
ch. 6; Barbour 1974 and 1990), as have many other scholars since
then. Note that many of the writers in theology and science described
here draw on philosophers of science who defend what is more commonly
called “scientific realism” though typically using Barbour’s term,
“critical realism”.
Barbour viewed critical realism as an
alternative to three competing interpretations of scientific
theories: a) classical or “naive” realism: scientific theories
provide a ‘photographic’ representation of the world; b)
instrumentalism: scientific theories are mere calculative devices,
and c) idealism: scientific theories depict reality as mental.
Instead, from a critical realist perspective, scientific theories
yield partial, revisable, abstract, but referential knowledge of the
world. Scientific theories are expressed linguistically through
metaphors and models. Drawing on Max Black, Mary Hesse, Donald Schon,
and others, Barbour defined “metaphor” as an open-ended analogy
whose meaning cannot be reduced a set of literal statements (cf.
Barbour, 1974, pp. 12-14; Analogy,
II.3). Scientific models, in turn, are systematically developed
metaphors. «Models and theories [...] selectively represent
particular aspects of the world for specific purposes. [They] are to
be taken seriously but not literally» (Barbour, 1990, p. 43).
Barbour then turned to the current discussion
of scientific methodology, with major breakthroughs by such
philosophers of science as N. R. Hanson, Gerald Holton, Thomas Kuhn,
Michael Polanyi, Steven Toulmin, and with special emphasis on the
writings of Imre Lakatos. He began with the empiricism of Carl
Hempel (1905-1997), whose “hypothetico-deductive” method brought
together inductivist and deductivist approaches to the construction
and testing of theories vis. Popperian falsificationism.
In the 1960s, this method was fundamentally recast. It was now seen
to operate within both the historicist and contextualist elements
which characterize the scientific community. These elements include
the “theory-laddenness of data”, the presence of
intersubjectivity rather than strict objectivity in scientific
rationality ( Experience,
IV), the structure of science through paradigms and their
revolutions in the history of science, the presence of metaphysical
assumptions about nature in scientific paradigms ( Metaphysics,
VI), and the role of aesthetics and values in theory choice ( Beauty,
II-III). Scientific theories are a human construction and
their conclusions are inherently tentative and subject to revision.
Nevertheless, according to Barbour, they are to be assessed by four
criteria which are reasonably trans-paradigmatic: agreement with
data, coherence, scope and fertility (cf. Barbour, 1990, pp. 33-35;
1966, ch. 6; 1974, ch. 6).
Barbour used these criteria to articulate what he called a “critical
realist” theory of truth. Like classical realism, the meaning of
truth in critical realism is correspondence with reality (i.e.,
reference; Realism,
II-IV) and the key criterion of truth is agreement of theory
with data ( Truth,
II.1). But we often have only indirect evidence for our theories;
moreover, networks of theories are tested together. Thus internal
coherence and scope also serve as criteria of truth, as stressed
by rationalists and philosophical idealists. Even this is insufficient
when competing theories are equally coherent and comprehensive;
hence fruitfulness serves as a fourth criterion of truth, as pragmatists,
instrumentalists and linguistic analysts stress. Thus intelligibility
and explanatory power, and not just observableness or predictive
success, is a guide to the real (cf. Barbour, 1966, pp. 170-173).
Turning to philosophy of religion, Barbour
constructed a similar defense of critical realism. Here his sources
in religious epistemology, methodology and language include the
writings of John Wisdom, John Hick, Ian Ramsey and Frederick Ferré
(cf. Barbour, 1990, chs. 2-3; 1966, chs. 8-9; 1974, chs. 4-9). With
these arguments in place, Barbour was prepared to make his crucial,
“bridging” methodological claim: «the basic structure of
religion is similar to that of science in some respects, though it
differs at several crucial points» (Barbour, 1990, p.36).
Similarities: Both science and religion make cognitive claims about
the world using a hypothetico-deductive method and a contextualist
and historicist framework. Both communities organize observation and
experience through models seen as analogical, extensible, coherent
and symbolic, and these models are expressed through metaphors.
Differences. But there are important differences in the “data”
of religion compared to that of science (cf. Barbour, 1990, ch. 2).
Religious models serve non-cognitive functions which are missing in
science, such as eliciting attitudes, personal involvement and
transformation. Moreover, compared to science, where theories tend
to dominate models, in religion models are more influential than
theories (cf. Barbour, 1990, pp. 46-47, 65). Religion lacks
lower-level laws such as those found in science, and the emergence
of consensus seems “an unrealizable goal.” Religion also
includes elements not found in science such as story, ritual, and
revelation through historical events.
Barbour’s argument culminates in his use of
paradigm analysis to place science and religion on a continuous
spectrum in which both display “subjective” as well as
“objective” features, though the former are more prominent in
religion and the latter in science ( Experience,
VI). The subjective features include «the influence of
theory on data, the resistance of comprehensive theories to
falsification, and the absence of rules for choice among paradigms».
Objective features include «the presence of common data on which
disputants can agree, the cumulative effect of evidence for or
against a theory, and the existence of criteria which are not
paradigm-dependent» (cf. Barbour, 1974, ch. 7; Barbour 1990, p.
65). It is the dynamic tension between similarities and differences,
and between subjective and objective features in both science and
religion, that together make Barbour’s analysis so original and
fruitful.
Yet even while Barbour was developing this
position, scientific realism was being challenged in a number of
ways. Though Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) had focused primarily on
factors internal to the scientific community, sociologists from the
1970s on explored the social construction of science. These
externalist accounts of science emphasized the social history of
science and the variety of political and economic influences on
science. According to one school (the “strong program”), the
theory-ladenness of data and the underdetermination of theories by
evidence heavily influence the formation and content of scientific
theories and the ways they are assessed (cf. Bloor, 1976; Rudwick,
1981; Hesse, 1988). At the same time, Marxists argued that science
is a source of power over nature and thus over people, power
rationalized by appeals to the myth of objectivity ( Materialism,
II). Meanwhile the diversity of philosophical views on
realism in science was growing, along with an increasing number of
anti-realist positions (among realists: Putnam, 1976; Hacking, 1983;
Leplin, 1984; among anti-realists: van Fraassen, 1980; Laudan, 1977;
for a recent anthology see McMullin, 1988). Realists frequently
argued that social and personal influences are gradually filtered
out by the methods of testing used in the sciences. Moreover, the
increasing success in predictive power and technological application
implies that scientific knowledge is referential. Barbour’s recent
assessment is that these externalist accounts provide a “valuable
corrective” to the internalist view, particularly regarding the
context of discovery. However, the appeal to interests is hard to
document and it underestimates the constraints on theories by data
and the fact that the testing of theories reduces distortions due to
ideologies and interests. Finally, the charge of cultural relativism
should apply to the externalist claim as well.
Barbour’s arguments have been developed in significant and diverse
ways by a variety of scholars. In his 1979 Bampton Lectures and
in his 1983 Mendenhall Lectures, Arthur Peacocke (born 1924) endorsed
critical realism in both science and religion (cf. Peacocke, 1979,
1984). In science, where challenges to realism from sociologists
of knowledge were mounting, Peacocke draw on arguments for realism
by Ernan McMullin, Hilary Putnam and Ian Hacking. In his 1993 Gifford
Lectures, Peacocke acknowledged the diversity of positions held
by scientific realists but argued for a “common core” of claims:
that scientific change is progressive and that the aim of science
is to depict reality (cf. Peacocke, 1993). Peacocke made a similar
case for critical realism in theology, where the social conditioning
of beliefs is generally assumed. As in science, theological concepts
and models are partial, inadequate, and revisable, and, unlike those
in science, they include a strong, affective function. Still Peacocke
views them as «(the) necessary and, indeed, the only ways of referring
to ‘God’ and to God’s relation with humanity», though he stresses
that referring to God (e.g., the via positiva) does not mean
describing God (the via negativa). Its grounding in a continuous
community and interpretative tradition make it “reasonable” to accept
theology’s explication of religious experience, though metaphorical
and revisable, as an inference to the best explanation (cf. Peacocke,
1993, pp. 11-19).
Other scholars in theology and science have
taken similar approaches. According to John Polkinghorne (born
1930), critical realism is the best explanation of the success of
science, the only philosophy adequate to scientific experience, and
the view most congenial to scientists themselves. In his 1994
Gifford Lectures, Polkinghorne drew on Thomas Torrance and
Michael Polanyi in highlight the doubly circular character of
knowledge: belief and understanding are mutually entailing, and what
is known and the knowledge of it are mutually conforming (cf.
Polkinghorne, 1994). Scientific theories are shaped by the way
things are, offering an ever increasing degree of verisimilitude as
suggested by his motto, “epistemology models ontology” (cf.
Polkinghorne, 1986, pp. 22-24). Polkinghorne offers similar
arguments for theology, too. «From a theological perspective, all
forms of realism are divinely underwritten, for God will not mislead
us...» (Polkinghorne, 1994, p. 156).
Note that Polkinghorne is apparently
restricting the term “epistemology” to the phenomena being
observed and recorded (e.g., data and experience)
whereas epistemology normally includes, and is even primarily
focused on, the existing theories which account for phenomena (e.g.,
deterministic chaos, quantum physics, Freudian psychology). Thus to
a critical realist the phrase “epistemology models ontology”
would seem more likely to mean that the theories in science, perhaps
even their specific concepts and terms, refer to reality regardless
of what the phenomena might suggest.
Wentzel van Huyssteen, in his earlier writings,
also viewed theology from a realist perspective, claiming that «theology
[...] is scientifically committed to a realist point of view» and
describing the referential power of theological language about God as “reality
depiction.” For van Huyssteen, the hypothetical status of
scientific statements become the eschatological dimension of
theological statements (cf. van Huyssteen, 1989, p. 162). Thomas F.
Torrance (born 1913), too, argues for the scientific character of
theology because, like the natural sciences, it adopts a method
which is determined by its object. For theology, the object is God,
known to us by God’s revelation in the incarnation and
resurrection of the Word ( Theology,
I) Thus the theoretical structures of theology disclose knowledge of
God just as the theoretical structures in science, like Einstein’s
general relativity, provide objective knowledge of this world.
According to Torrance, natural theology can find a place within
positive theology, though not as a prolegomenon to it — a view
which he reports he persuaded Karl Barth (1886-1968) eventually to
accept (cf. Torrance, 1969, ch. 6; Torrance, 1976).
The
central role Barbour gave to metaphors, models and paradigms in both
science and theology has stimulated wide discussion, too. In 1982,
Sallie McFague drew directly from Barbour’s work in pointing to
basic similarities between models in theology and in science, but
she also stressed four important differences: they provide order in
theology while stimulating new discoveries in science; they more
clearly carry meaning in theology than in science; and unlike in
science, they are ubiquitous and hierarchical, as well as eliciting
feelings and action (cf. MacFague, 1982, pp. 101-108), in theology.
McFague combined this with Paul Ricoeur’s notion of metaphor as
“is and is not” in developing what she then termed
“metaphorical theology”. Using this approach she has developed
new metaphors for God as Mother, Lover, and Friend, and the world as
the body of God ( Pantheism,,
III.3) which challenge theology’s patriarchal and androcentric
distortions and fund her work in ecological theology ( Ecology,
III-IV).
In 1984, Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell
contrasted two meanings of analogy:
a) as an extension of our conceptual network from a known to an
unknown and b) as a new and dynamic relation between two separate
networks which distorts both and induces tension. They call the
latter “metaphor”, concluding that the relation between science
and religion is itself a metaphor. In 1985 Janet Soskice published a
thorough study of metaphor in religious and scientific language,
emphasizing the distinction between metaphor and model which she
found conflated in Black, Barbour, Ferré and David Tracy (cf.
Soskice, 1985, pp, 101-107; Soskice, 1988). Although she vigorously
defended theological realism, Soskice also stressed the social and
contextual nature of scientific realism, in which theoretical terms
«are seen as representing reality without claiming to be
representationally privileged». Theological realism, in turn,
distinguishes between referring to God and defining “God”, and
employs a causal theory of reference (cf. Soskice, 1985, pp. 107,
131-148; Logic,
V). In 1988, Hans Küng applied paradigm analysis to the history of
theology and compared the results to the history of science. In
contrast to the way paradigms are successively replaced in science,
giving it an irreversible history, in theology contrasting paradigms,
such as Thomism, Reformation theology, modernity, may well coexist
in history (cf. Theology for
the Third Millennium, New York 1988, p. 156). In science the
next revolution comes at the limits of the existing paradigm. In
theology the ‘primal testimony’ of scripture and the events of
the history of Israel and Jesus Christ are the sources of each new
revolution.
An important development has been the theme of
“consonance” introduced in 1981 by Ernan McMullin. His concern
was the search for a “coherence of world-view” to which all
forms of human knowing can contribute. The consonance that
characterizes such a world-view does not require or even expect
direct support. Instead it would involve mutual contributions in a
relation that is tentative and open to “constant slight shift”.
Beginning in 1989, I combined McMullin’s idea with McFague’s
epistemic claim about the “is and is not” structure of metaphor
to include and thus to learn from both consonance and
“dissonance” between scientific and theological theories. Rather
than undercutting a coherent world-view, dissonance points to the
dynamic character of our world view, specifying where problems arise,
shifts are required, and potentially greater coherence can be sought.
Moreover, by recognizing that theories in both science and theology
evolve and are eventually replaced, we can build change directly
into the relation between science and theology rather than being
threatened by it (cf. Russell, 1989, pp. 188, 194, 204; Russell,
1994, 1994b and 1996).
Over the past decade, Ted Peters has developed this approach in
terms of what he calls “hypothetical consonance” (cf. peters, 1988;
peters 1998, pp. 18-19). If consonance in the “strong sense” means
complete harmony or accord, we might «hope to find (it), but we
have not found it yet». What we do have are shared domains of inquiry
or consonance in a “weak sense”, but this is enough to encourage
further exploration. He bases this on his critical realist assumption
that theologians and scientists are seeking to understand the same
reality. The qualifier “hypothetical” reminds theologians to treat
their assertions as fallible and subject to possible disconfirmation
as well as confirmation. Willem
B. Drees, though exploring the concept of consonance, has pointed
out the problematic assumptions underlying realism and a correspondence
theory of truth. Instead he proposes “constructing a consonance
world” which includes God’s otherness and the prophetic challenge
of lived values (cf. Drees, 1990 and 1993). Our religious traditions
invite us to wander through, and our sciences to wonder about, the
reality which transcends and sustains our lives and to engage ethically
with the challenge of the future (cf. Drees, 1996, ch. 5).
III. Further Developments in Methodology
According to Wolfhart Pannenberg, the defense of the truth of Christianity
since the thirteenth century has been intimately tied to the claim
that theology is a science (Wissenschaft) ( Teology,
III). In the contemporary context, Pannenberg first uses Popper
to challenge the logical positivist’s characterization of science.
He then adopts Popper’s view that scientific theories are revisable
hypotheses and applies it to theology as well, though he ultimately
rejects Popperian falsificationism (cf. Pannenberg, 1976). Instead
he argues that theories in the natural and human sciences are to
be judged by the criteria of coherence, parsimony, and accuracy.
Pannenberg then draws on Stephen Toulmin (born 1922), for whom theories
in history, science, and hermeneutics
serve as explanations by placing facts in a broader context. For
theology, the explanatory context becomes the whole of reality,
including the future. The resurrection
of Jesus plays a pivotal role in Pannenberg’s methodology by proleptical
revealing the future as eschaton. Pannenberg then developed a criterion
for acceptability of both theological and scientific theories: the
most adequate theory is the one that can incorporate its competitors.
Conflicting religious traditions can thus be judged by their ability
both to conceive of the whole of reality as it is proleptically
revealed and to provide an explanation which more fully incorporates
all that we know of it than do other traditions (cf. Murphy, 1990,
ch. 2).
In 1990, Nancey Murphy criticized
Pannenberg’s methodology, claiming that Pannenberg cannot answer
the Humean challenge to theological rationality. Hume’s
point of view is incommensurable with Pannenberg’s, and thus
cannot be incorporated into Pannenberg’s system, as Pannenberg’s
own methodology requires. As a more adequate alternative she
recommended the adoption of Imre Lakatos’s methodology of
scientific research programs, with its central core and surrounding
belt of auxiliary hypotheses. According to Lakatos, we should judge
the relative progress or degeneration of such research programs on
the basis of their ability to predict and corroborate novel facts
(cf. Murphy, 1990, chs. 2-3). Murphy then offers a crucial
modification of Lakatos’ conception of “novel facts”: «A fact
is novel if it is one not used in the construction of the theory T
that it is taken to confirm... [that is] one whose existence,
relevance to T, or interpretability in light of T is first
documented after T is proposed» (ibidem,
p. 68). This modification allows Murphy to apply Lakatos’s
methodology to theology, to decide rationally which theological
research programs are empirically progressive, and thus to complete
the argument for the scientific status of theology.
Philip Clayton (1989) has also advocated the
theological appropriation of Lakatosian methodology. Clayton views
“explanation” as the key concept embracing both the natural and
social sciences and, ultimately, theology — one with sufficient
diversity to span vastly differing disciplines while retaining an
underlying unity. Here the revisionist, contextualist, and
historicist arguments in recent philosophy of science become
crucial. In the natural sciences, where one interprets physical
data, the truth of an explanation is pivotal. In the social
sciences, however, where one interprets both physical data and the
experience of actor-subjects (i.e., the “double hermeneutic”, Hermeneutics,
V.3), explanation means “understanding” (Verstehen).
Theological explanations, then, are subject to validation not by
verificationist / foundationalist standards, but by intersubjective
testability and universalizability, as performed by the disciplinary
community. Clayton supports his case by relying on the discovery /
justification distinction: religious claims can be truthful even if
their sources are in social, and not just physical, data. The key,
though, is Lakatos’ requirement that a previously specified set of
criteria is held by the community by which competing explanatory
hypotheses can be assessed, including the stipulation of “novel
facts”.
Over the past decade, Murphy and Clayton have offered important
critiques of their corresponding positions which have further revealed
the layers of complexity that underlie theological rationality.
Meanwhile, Murphy’s approach has been implemented in discussions
of theological anthropology by Philip Hefner (1993) pragmatic evaluation
of religion by Karl Peters (1977), and the theological implications
of cosmology in my work (cf. Russell, 1993) I believe that further
pursuit of the suggestions by both Murphy and Clayton is an extremely
important task at the frontiers of theology and science today (further
developments in Clayton and Knapp, 1996; Murphy and Ellis, 1996;
Murphy, in Richardson and Wildman, 1996).
IV. Anti-Reductionism
In an effort to understand more clearly the types of relations
that exist between different scientific and theological disciplines,
numerous scholars in theology and science have focused on the issue
of reductionism. Scholars now generally
recognize several types of reductionism, with most rejecting its
stronger forms in favor of a non-reducible, hierarchical model of
disciplinary relations. Others, however, reject the foundationalist
overtones of this model and opt instead for non-foundationalist
approaches.
In
1974, Francisco Ayala identified three distinct types of
reductionist theses: a) Methodological reductionism is both a
research strategy for studying wholes, such as cells, in terms of
their parts, such as macromolecules, and for applying successful
theories in one area, such as Darwinian evolution ( Evolution,
IV), to other areas, such as sociology or religion. b)
Epistemological reduction is the claim that processes, properties,
laws or theories found in higher levels of complexity, such as the
neurosciences, can be derived entirely from those found in lower
levels of complexity, such as biology, and, ultimately, physics. c)
Ontological reductionism is the view that higher-level, more complex
entities are nothing but complex organizations of simpler entities,
i.e., the whole is “nothing but” the sum of its parts (cf. Ayala
and Dobzhansky, 1974, Introduction).
Ayala’s analysis has been widely used in
theology and science beginning as early as 1976, when Peacocke gave
an extensive treatment of reductionism (cf. Peacocke, 1976). In a
recent essay, Murphy has added a fourth type: d) Causal reductionism
asserts that all causes are “bottom-up”; the characteristics and
processes of the parts entirely determine those of the whole. She
has also clarified an ambiguity in Ayala’s description of
ontological reductionism. According to Murphy, ontological
reductionism per se is the view that no new kinds of “metaphysical
ingredients” need to be added to produce higher-level entities
from lower-level ones. It rejects the existence of “vital
forces” or “entelechy” in the life sciences, as well as mind
or soul as the basis of consciousness ( Mind-Body,
Relationship; Soul). Murphy then adds a fifth type of
reductionism: e) Reductive materialism is a stronger claim than
ontological reductionism, insisting that «(only) the entities at
the lowest level are really real; higher level entities [...] are
only composite structures made of atoms» (cf. Murphy in Russell et
al., 1998, pp. 446-447; Materialism).
We can thus reject reductive materialism by arguing that
higher-level entities are “as real as” the entities that compose
them, and we can do so while agreeing with ontological reductionists
in rejecting vitalism and other ontological dualisms.
Most scholars in theology and science, while
accepting the importance of methodological reductionism in science,
view epistemic reductionism and reductive materialism as
undercutting the credibility of higher-level disciplines and
supporting the “conflict” model between science and theology. To
counter this, they typically argue that the academic disciplines
form a non-reducible hierarchy, starting from physics at the bottom
and moving upwards through chemistry,
biology,
physiology, the neurosciences, the behavioral, psychological and
social sciences. The ordering of the hierarchy reflects the
increasing complexity
of the phenomena being studied; more importantly, it allows both for
rules of constraint and genuine emergence. Constraint implies that
the laws, processes and properties at lower levels, such as physics
and biology, constrain the laws, processes and properties at upper
levels, such as psychology or ethics. Thus the laws of chemistry
must be consistent with, and not contradict, the laws of physics.
Emergence implies that upper levels are partially autonomous; they
include new laws, processes and properties which cannot be fully
reduced to, explained away by, or derived from those of the lower
levels. The ordering of the sciences in the hierarchy corresponds
roughly to the rise of ever more complex physical and biological
systems during the history of the universe, including galactic,
stellar and planetary development, and eventually molecular and
evolutionary biology.
As early as 1979, Arthur Peacocke (1979)
described such a hierarchy of disciplines, drawing on the writings
of M. Beckner, M. Polanyi, and E. Nagel along with Ayala and T.
Dobzhansky. By 1993 he had foliated the hierarchy into two
dimensions: vertically it consists in four levels of increasing
complexity (the physical world, living organisms, the behavior of
living organisms, and human culture) while horizontally it depicts
systems ordered by part-to-whole hierarchies of structural and/or
functional organization (eg., in biology: macromolecules,
organelles, cells, organs, individual organisms, populations,
ecosystems) (cf. Peacocke, 1993, ch. 12; cf. also Peacocke, 1986,
ch. 1). Peacocke’s analysis undoubtedly reflects the broad
consensus of the scientific community.
A key issue, though, is the place and role of
theology in the hierarchy of knowledge. Peacocke tends to place
theology at the top of the hierarchy. As the all-inclusive study of
God, humanity and the world it cannot be isolated from, but instead
it should seek to integrate, all that we know from the rest of
hierarchy ( Unity
of Knowledge). Moreover, by putting theology at the top, it
will be maximally constrained by the rest of human knowledge.
Moreover, by placing theology at the top of the hierarchy, it is
maximally constrained by, and responsible to, the discoveries and
conclusions of the other disciplines (cf. Peacocke, 1993, ch. 12).
In a recent proposal, Nancey Murphy and George Ellis suggest that
the hierarchy be modified into the shape of a “Y”. The hierarchy
starts with physics and moves up to chemistry and biology. Here,
though, the hierarchy splits, with one branch leading to levels
which study more encompassing wholes, including geology, ecology,
astrophysics and cosmology, while the other leads to levels which
study more complex systems, including psychology, the social
sciences, and ethics. An inverted “Y” then rejoins lines from
cosmology and ethics to end in theology (cf. Murphy and Ellis, 1996,
pp. 65, 86, 204). A crucial ingredient of their argument is that the
higher levels in the scheme complete the lower levels by offering
answers to key questions raised by them. This gives theology an
essential role in the overall system: «A single theory of divine
purpose answers the ultimate questions arising from each branch of
the hierarchy» (ibidem,
p. 204).
Causal reductionists, however, might allow for
a hierarchy of disciplines while still claiming that all causality
is bottom-up. Even if higher level theories describe the
regularities of their phenomena in apparently irreducible ways, the
possibility of causal reductionism remains, as exemplified in the
mechanistic philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries ( Mechanics,
IV). To counter this, a variety of scenarios have been explored in
which processes at upper levels actually do influence processes at
the lower levels. These include “top-down causality”,
“whole-part constraint”, and “supervenience” (cf. Murphy,
1996, ch. 3).
Some scholars in theology and science, while accepting the preceding
arguments for an epistemic hierarchy of disciplines, reject the
foundationalist assumption that often accompanies it. Foundationalism
is one of the central characteristics of the modern period. It is
the assumption that, like the foundations of a building, undeniable
facts (following Humean empiricism, Hume,
II) or “clear and distinct ideas” (following Cartesian idealism, Descartes,
II, IV) provide an indubitable foundation for all of knowledge in
each discipline; from them all other epistemic claims within a discipline,
or even between them, must be deduced or justified. In
its place, Murphy, for example, adopts W.V. O. Quine’s non-foundationalist
or holist approach. Here systems of knowledge are pictured more
like a web or net than a building, with each level in the hierarchy
of disciplines forming its own web. Core theories that characterize
each discipline lie at the center of the web; they are indirectly
connected to the edge of the web and its ties to the appropriate
facts and experiences. As before, both constraint and emergence
operate between the disciplines (cf. Murphy, 1996, ch. 3; Murphy
in Richardson and Wildman, 1996, pp. 105-120).
V. Ontological Implications
We now face what is perhaps the most challenging question of all:
what is an appropriate ontology in light of these epistemic schemes?
Most writers in theology and science seek to avoid two extreme positions:
monism in the form of either reductive materialism or absolute idealism,
and dualism in the form of vitalism (life is a separate, nonmaterial
entity, principle or agency) or Cartesianism (mind and body are
independent realities). However, there are several possibilities
which reject both of these forms of dualism and monism while still
remaining monist in character. The three most prominent include:
a) emergentist monism (nonreductive physicalism, ontological reductionism):
There are genuinely new properties and processes at higher levels
of organization, but the world is still composed strictly of physical
matter (i.e., matter as described by physics); b) ontological emergence:
The new properties and processes that emerge at higher levels of
organization indicate that the ontology of the world, though monistic,
cannot be reduced to that described by physics alone. The ontological
unity or monism of complex phenomena is thus intrinsically differentiated
(as suggested by the term “dipolarity”) c) organicism (panexperientialism
/ process metaphysics): Every real event or “actual occasion” includes
the capacity for experience (“prehension”), and thus a mental “pole”,
although this mental aspect produces consciousness and self-consciousness
only when sufficient biological complexity have evolved in the form
of coherent societies of actual occasions. Panexperientialists frequently
reject ‘emergence’ as a “category mistake”, thereby sharpening the
difference between this approach and the preceding two (cf. Birch
in Russell et al., 1998).
One can find scholars in theology and science
who endorse different combinations among these approaches to
epistemology and ontology. Peacocke, Polkinghorne and Barbour, for
example, accept the hierarchy of the sciences though they differ on
its ontological implications (emergentist monism, dipolar monism,
and panexperientialism, respectively). Murphy and I work with
non-foundationalist epistemologies, but she prefers nonreductive
physicalism while I favor ontological emergence. On the other hand,
some theists, such as Richard Swinburne and Sir
John Eccles, adopt both epistemic and ontological dualism. The
differences between these positions is relatively minor, though,
when compared with the views of atheists such as Richard Dawkins or
Peter Atkins who represent the “conflict” model of science and
religion and defend both epistemic reductionism and reductive
materialism.
Finally, then, philosophy can be seen as
functioning in at least two distinct ways in the theology and
science conversations. It can provide an overarching synthesis, a
complete metaphysical framework that is, according to Whitehead, «consistent
and coherent, adequate and applicable» to all fields of knowledge.
Examples include William Stoeger’s use of neo-Thomism (Thomas
Aquinas) or Barbour’s use of process philosophy (Whitehead,
V) as providing a broad arena for relating a series of theological
issues and a diversity of scientific fields. Such systems allow one
to ask very general questions about nature and draw on, and smoothly
integrate, a variety of sciences for distinctive answers. The
difficulty comes when the system no longer suits changes in
scientific theories, for a metaphysical system is usually not open
to a “quick fix”, or when the metaphysics limits rather than
facilitates the theological agenda and its engagement with science.
On the other hand, philosophy can serve a more limited goal: it
can provide specific terms and concepts, such as space, time,
matter and causality, that are shared
by differing disciplines and carry similar meanings without embedding
them in an overarching metaphysical framework. Examples include
Peacocke’s use of “law and chance” in both scientific areas such
as biological evolution and in the doctrine of creation, and Polkinghorne’s
use of openness in relating chaos and complexity in nature to the
possibility of divine action in the world. On the one hand, a philosophical
analysis of scientific cosmology can point to the contingency and
rational intelligibility of the universe. These presuppositions
may be imported into theology where they the become relevant to
the doctrine of creation ( Cosmology,
VI; Creation, III).
It can also mediate a concept of “nature” from theology to one underlying
the natural sciences ( Natural
Laws, III, V). The difficulty with this approach, on the
other hand, is that, without a single overall and unifying system,
there may be pervasive questions underlying the entire relationship
between theology and science which cannot be addressed by the fragmentary
connections offered by individual terms and concepts, and the theological
reconstructions in light of science may be more piecemeal than broadly
coherent ( Natural
Sciences in the work of theologians, II).
VI. Summary of critical realism and open issues
Over the past four decades, the predominant school of thought among
scholars in theology and science, particularly of those coming from
a liberal theological perspective, has been critical realism. The
term stood for a “packaged deal” whose elements were brought together
from a variety of various philosophical contexts. They include :
a) the ubiquitous role and complex epistemic structure of metaphor
in all language (against literalism and expressivism); b) a Hempelian
hypothetico-deductive methodology embedded in a contextualist /
explanatory and historicist / competitive framework (against positivism,
empiricism and instrumentalism); c) a hierarchy of disciplines with
both constraints and autonomy (against epistemic reductionism);
d) a commitment to referentiality, whether of individual terms or
of entire theories (against some aspects of the sociology of knowledge),
and with it a theory of truth combining correspondence, coherence,
and pragmatism; and yet e) a genuine division over metaphysical
issues, whose most representative alternatives are emergent monism
versus panexperientialism. Each of these elements, of course, raised
complex issues that were highly debated. Still there was sufficient
agreement for these elements to form what can be called the “consensus
view” in theology and science since the 1960's. For these scholars,
critical realism was seen as providing the crucial “bridge” between
theology and science, making possible real dialogue and growing
interaction. During this period, however, each of these elements
has come under criticism. Some scholars working in theology and
science have stressed the difficulties facing a realist interpretation
of specific scientific theories, such as quantum
mechanics (cf. Russell, 1988) ,as well as key theological terms,
such as the concept of God.
Some have acknowledged the diversity of realist
positions taken by philosophers as well as the continuing challenge
to realism by the sociology of knowledge (cf. Peacocke, 1993, ch.
12; Leplin, 1984; Peacocke, 1984, pp. 19-22). Some have given
increased attention to the diversity of models of rationality ( Reason)
and their relative appropriateness for “science and religion”
(cf. Stenmark, 1995) and the importance of differences, as well as
similarities, between theology and science from the standpoint of pragmatism.
Some have moved to a non-foundationalist (and in this specific sense
a post-modernist) epistemology, either keeping correspondence and
referentiality (cf. Clayton, 1989) or shifting to a pragmatic theory
of truth (cf. Murphy, 1996). Some working with an all-embracing
philosophical system, such as Whiteadian metaphysics, have developed
a broad set of theological positions in light of science (cf.
Barbour, 1997; Griffin, 1988; Haught, 1995) while others who make
more limited use of metaphysics have developed equally broad
theological arguments (cf. Polkinghorne, 1994). Other positions have
emerged at increasing distances from the “consensus view”. For
some, a post-modernist view offers an attractive approach, drawing
on Continental and / or Anglo-American sources, and for growing
numbers, feminist critiques of science are crucial (cf. Drees, 1996,
ch. 5). Some have abandoned realism as a whole while still finding
elements of the preceding still helpful in relating science and
religion.
On balance, though, critical realism continues
to be defended and deployed widely in theology and science, and it
continues to be presupposed by both most working scientists, by many
theologians, and in much of the public discourse about both science
and religion. On balance I believe it to be of enduring importance,
both for its crucial role in the historical developments of the past
decades and as a point of departure for future research. Whatever
directions are taken in the future, it constitutes the key
methodological contribution that the “first generation” gave to
make discourse regarding theology and science possible today.
Robert J. Russell
See also: Culture;
Popularization of Science; Unity of Knowledge; University.
Documents
of the Catholic Church related to the subject
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